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1. Introduction  
 
My purpose is to show how globalization effects on the activity of welfare state, and in 
turn, how state activity and welfare state influence process and outcome of globalization. 
Significant empirical research based on broad databases has appeared on the scene in the last 
two decades. By the help of it I would like to show what kind of limits erected by the 
globalization there is for the state, and what kind of chances is given, as well. From a 
retrospective point of view the discourse about the ‘crisis’ of the welfare state started as an 
internal  issue of the developed countries in the ‘70ies, but nowadays, after the engine of 
development having been transposed into the emerging countries, it would be an outmoded 
way to narrow our focus exclusively on the Occident, and try to draw a picture based only on 
the events, assessment  and qualifications of the developed part of the world. Therefore it is 
an important task of the study to overview the forms of welfare activities in the emerging 
regions. 
 
2. Overview of the empirical research  
 
This research undertakes to show international public finance statistics, hardly used or 
analyzed in Hungarian literature, and to inform the reader about the results of the empirical 
studies based on these data. It is a problem that good, trustful, detailed, comprehending the 
whole Earth and long time period, statistics are hardly available. Notwithstanding, on the 
basis of the available statistics some study have tried to draw conclusions about the relation of 
welfare state and globalization. 
I have tried to show, beside the developed countries, the most important developing and 
emerging countries, the structure of their budget and public finances, and the change of these. 
I have studied whether the results and conclusions are durable through the evolvement of the 
globalization.  
There are, of course, not unequivocal and absolutely right methods in our field. 
Analysis of globalization as the opening of the economy is not free from methodological 
difficulties. One important of them is that external opening takes place in almost no case in 
itself, but as part of a package of several other measures. There was a significant change in the 
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evaluation of free trade in the ‘60ies and ‘70ies, but studies that founded it were not free from 
methodological problems. They calculated only the deadweight loss of protectionism in many 
countries, while they did not undertake to estimate the benefits. They did not verify, but 
assume harmful character of trade barriers. Some analysis made by World Bank do not 
identify the countries by economic policy indicators when categorizing the countries as 
‘globalizing’ or ‘nonglobalizing’, but by the volume growth of foreign trade. But this way the 
direction of causation can not be defined. The direction can be just the opposite of the 
assumed: it might be true that growth and the decrease in poverty is more massive in the 
countries defined as globalizing the above way, but the real connection is that these countries 
are successful by means of their national strategy, and it is in parallel and as a result of their 
improvement that they deploy their trade barriers and integrate into the world market. 
Several studies made by prestigious institutions, e.g. in the topic of the relation between 
growth and the size of government resulted in ambiguous conclusion. They make difficult to 
make practical recommendations. Estimates of different studies show in opposite directions, 
different regressions in the same study found different conclusions (they are not robust), and 
several regressions are opposing just those theories that the authors themselves support, or try 
to support. Therefore I did not find the results even of the studies applying the most 
sophisticated apparatus and recommending to diminish the size of the government really 
persuasive. When we read the conclusions of the authors of these studies the picture seems to 
be quite clear but when we put the details of their analysis to these conclusions it is far from 
that. However I consider microlevel analysis of state functioning informative. If the bigger 
government had negative effects it could be compensated by the positive effect of higher 
efficiency. One can not measure the skill and ability of state by the ‘size’ of government. And 
the size of government is no the same as the sum total of the budget. It is in general neglected 
by the studies dealing with public finance aggregates and prosperity. 
Now it is impossible not to deal with those researches that measure the peoples’ 
satisfaction with the society, economy and the government. There is no meaning to speak of  
welfare characteristic of economic growth and state activity if the citizens themselves do not 
feel that these are contributing to their well being. Some methodological issues arises in 
regard with these studies, as well, not only with those dealing with state and growth. Both 
studies of growth and of happiness are willing to show linear connection between state 
activity and growth or happiness, and by this way arguing not for a smaller state but for the 
secession of state.  
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Though in understanding and evaluation of globalization and state activity one scale 
can be  the change in inequality and poverty, and social changes in the countries opening their 
economy. Again, measure and judgement is burdened by several methodological debates. The 
picture is ambiguous especially in developing and emerging economies. The judgments of the 
relatively bad social statistics and field studies are differing significantly. However it seems 
that in case of at least the biggest countries, China, and India, and some other countries, and at 
least in regard with poverty we can speak of the improvement of the situation.  
I have found those research program especially interesting that enlisted econometric 
proofs that on the one hand the existence and extension of welfare state may be influenced by 
foreign economic integration positively; and on the other hand that behind this relation is the 
phenomenon that citizens were willing to accept foreign opening if the state provided some 
kind of guarantees or insurance to compensate the losers. Empirical evidences are not 
completely free from methodological difficulties, e.g. reverse causation can emerge here. as 
well, but it seems for me that this studies have handled this problem successfully. It is 
complex issue to show the mechanisms through which the opening effects on the size of 
government: it can be seen that with the intermediation of the size of the risks ensuing from 
the openness. 
It is an important question whether new waves of globalization have overwritten the 
conclusions drawn from somewhat earlier time series. And whether we can have a different 
view if we interpret globalization not in terms of foreign trade but in terms of speed up of 
capital movements. There are some evidences that something has changed. One study says 
that in the ‘90-ies the foreign economic openness helps the retrenchment of welfare state, 
while the political resistance potential can not significantly influence; ability of political 
institutions to resist was able to hinder retrenchment only in combination with economic 
closeness. That is the countries that are relatively close with strong resistance ability were 
able to withstand, and those that are relatively open with weak resistance potential were not. 
However it must be noted that even retrenchment does not mean decrease of welfare 
expenditures in proportion of GDP, but slower growth, and does not mean any case a loss in 
real value. What is more, other studies are on the view that change of central governmental 
expenditures was influenced significantly neither by trade openness, nor by other 
globalization indicators. The same studies, while showing that strengthening of democracy 
was not significant, provide evidence that interaction term of democracy and openness are 
almost always significant in expansion of welfare institutions. It means that it is in the 
countries leading the processes both of economic opening and democratization that the 
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government consumption and government expenditures are growing the fastest. Econometric 
studies show regional differences of globalization in Latin America, East Asia, and East 
Europe. 
Besides statistical and econometric results my work analyzed the most important 
changes in particular countries, and I have examined in what extent these are in harmony with 
globalization processes, and in what extent opposed that. In this sense I have studied whether 
changes in pension systems, or incentives structure in unemployment provisions are linked to, 
and in what way, the globalization effects. I think I was able to show that behind the 
differences (both in the procedures, and the end state) among countries in the reforms of 
welfare systems there is not one overriding cause, the globalization. Such factors as the 
characteristics and strength of existing institutions, historical past, culture, expectations of 
voters, size of external shocks, influence of international financial institutions etc. are 
important. 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
  
Globalisation has manifold meaning, therefore I had to define how I understand the 
term. I give priority in understanding the term to the increase of foreign economic 
connections, economic integration, and foreign working capital flows. Globalisations does not 
mean that the logic of financial sector gains exclusivity. Importance of geographical distances 
and characteristics does not evaporates. What is more in the era of globalisation a new theory 
of economic geography is emerging that heavily criticises “one point” paradigm of 
neoclassical economics. In regard with welfare state there is several concepts, as well. I make 
a distinction between welfare state in the narrow sense, and the welfare aspects of state 
activity in a broader sense. As for the former I accept Nicholas Barr approach according to 
which the term “welfare state” can be understood as state activity on the next comprehensive 
fields: health, education, nutrition, housing, and other welfare services. In the broad sense 
among welfare aspects there are the stabilisation of income, stimulation of growth, decrease 
of poverty, revenue generation, and subjective perception of all these by the citizens. These 
latter ones are especialy important while one investigates developing and emerging countries, 
however development of welfare state in the narrow sense has an outmost importance even in 
this regions of the world. Measure of wellbeing is a difficult thing, while the measure of the 
public finance aggregates seems to be much simpler, but the latter is only one slice of the 
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former. Welfare economics enlist some efficiency reasons for state activity. In my view, while 
these reasons are quite relevant, understanding emergence and persistence of the state with 
welfare commitments can be understood only taking into consideration the political and 
historical dimensions.  
Following Paul Krugman, Dani Rodrik, Adrian Wood és Joseph Stiglitz, I think that 
theory of  comparative advantages is not a useless scheme in understanding globalisation, 
especially if we examine the relations between South and North countries. But that form of 
this theory that tries to interpret the advantages and disadvantages, international distribution, 
and temporal evolutions of these independently from state activity, speaking as if the labour 
or capital abundance were “natural” characteristics of the countries, can be considered 
antiquated. Studies show that the states, through following conscious or not conscious, only 
ex post being reconstructed, strategies or quasi-strategies, were able to form, turn aside, or 
destroy/weaken their comparative characteristics belonging originally into their room of 
manoeuvre, or to bring these factors into their range of effect. Even from historical, watching 
back a hundred year, perspective we can see that state activity was present outside of the 
center of the developed world, too, and that state activity has different strength and direction. 
State activity is not necessarily hindering, but also not necessarily stimulating; this can be 
shown both on theoretical level and analyzing historical facts. 
Whereas old theory of comparative advantages assumes perfect competition, because 
of economy of scale competition becomes in fact imperfect (monopolist or oligopolist). By 
economy of scale becoming the source of division of labour such a factor emerges among the 
factors explaining globalization that does not, or not directly depend on the distribution of 
resources and technological differences, but from a historical point of view is contingent, 
coming into being not, or not in the narrow sense, from economic influences. Precondition of 
economy of scale is the formation of a certain size of production, that can not be reasoned by 
the comparative advantages. From a narrow economic point of view it is undefined which 
sector, which firm, and in which country gains economy of scale, that is where the firms on an 
integrated market will settle. 
Because of economy of scale on sector level there is no guaranty that the most suitable 
country will produce a certain product, therefore those who hope that their comparative 
advantages will make their way spontaneously on an aggregate level, will possibly be 
disappointed. The other side of the coin is that the globalisation-critique that have fears for the 
developed countries because of the low wage level (as a comparative advantage) of 
developing countries loses some of its relevance 
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Comparative advantages are considered, at least in the long run, changeable, and not a 
constant feature of a region or a country once and for all. These can be modified by a strategy, 
and reforms, and can need the defense of the state itself. A novelty of globalization is that 
international trade is not only broadening but the pattern of it is also changing. 
Despite its limits the theory of comparative advantages based on skill differences in a 
certain sense gives a right description of trade relations between South and North in the last 
some decades. This model explains relatively well the modifications of relative wages in this 
time period. But it does not account for absolute differences in wages that had emerged 
earlier. In the comparative logic absolute wages are higher in the North because the skilled 
workers clustered over there are more productive. But the next question that this theory can 
not answer is why the skilled are clustered together in the North. Answering this latter 
question needs consideration of historical dimension, taking into account the role of the state, 
and problem of characteristics of skills. 
We must detect the remaining dominance of the North-North relations. The engine of 
North-North trade is product differentiation, competition in innovation, and economy of scale. 
Capital and labour in developed countries have similar quality, technological differences are 
not really significant. It is intra-sectoral trade that has overwhelming importance in which, 
compared to inter-sectoral trade, comparative advantages in the classical sense play minor 
role. In the North-North trade non-tradable services, among them (welfare and not welfare) 
those provided by the state, take part as input to producers of tradable sectors. The most 
important structural factor is not the competition of poor or middle income countries with the 
most developed ones, but the big economic centers, basically political, strategy to increase 
their influence in global governance. 
Multinationals in the center make their own affiliates in developing and middle 
income countries to compete each other. Among researches there are those that say that 
multinationals’ influence are based not on the huge wage advantage of the South, that hardly 
can be compensated by any measures of the developed countries’ authorities, rather on more 
delicious, wage and other  distinctions between countries on similar level of development. 
Foreign investors bring decision not according to the rough differences between the countries 
defined by the theory of comparative advantages. Studies on the flow of FDI does not verify 
the view that the broadening of the economic connections with the South bring North wages 
and welfare system under dramatic pressure, that is it cannot be spoken of social dumping.  
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4. Main results of the study  
 
1. Globalization has taken place not outside of states, or governments, but has been 
formed by the latter 
 
In globalization state were not passive contemplators, but, either individually or 
taking part in the international community actively acted upon the preparatory work on 
the regulations that started and strengthened globalization. This theses are in opposition to 
those that globalization is the result of  some ‘necessary’ and ‘irresistible’ forces. The 
stronger states and alliances of them formed and are forming the processes in their own 
interests, and creating new abilities, and power types to compensate that globalization 
erodes some of their competencies.  The disorder, in fact growing, is the consequence of 
that the decisive states do not see sufficient reason for higher level intervention, and for 
stronger cooperation in issues beyond the scope of individual states. 
It is often mentioned as irresistible force in connection with globalisation the 
improvement of transportation and information techniques. However transportation 
techniques can not be the determining factor of globalisation because innovation and 
application of them happened before the era of globalisation. Transportation innovations 
do not abandon distance but redraw the significance of it. In the models of international 
trade distance remains an important explanatory factor. It is not clear in what sense the 
world of mutinationals organizing their global activity by the means of communication 
technologies brings power shift in comparison to that situation when foreign trade took 
place among big companies organising mainly only the local-national economic 
processes. 
Information technologies are applied in the world of labour very unevenly, one can 
not speak of its uniform effect leading to globalisation. Even in the financial sector 
integrated by the new techniques in the furthest geographical distance makes its way 
markedly. On the one hand time and space seems to loose its relevance by infotech in the 
system of 24 hours operation of financial trade connecting all the financial companies. But 
on the other hand now some segments of money- and capital markets are more imbedded 
in their locality and concentrated more heavily than earlier. The ideas alleging causality of 
transportation and information technique usually tries to make us believe in the fate that 
state and politics cannot influence internationalisation of financial markets. But 
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liberalisation of the latter is not the result of a kind of “inevitable” technical, but of a 
political factor. 
Some people think that globalisation can not be influenced by politics because of 
enlarged strength of  multinationals. Though the strength of multis might have increased, I 
do not think that this idea is right. At first sight the rise of multis in the ‘70ies seems to 
verify that it was close connection with the weakening of the interstate cooperation. But 
the events in the last some decades rather underpin the view that big companies need 
stabilisation of mass production, that is coordinated policy of the states under the aegis of 
a kind of ‘international keynesism’. Multis need and support international governance but 
try to bend on their own interest. Globalisation does not make states insignificant because 
interdependency of the economies necessitates legal guarantees, the latter demands 
institutional infrastructure, that can be created through bi- or multilateral coordination 
among states. One can mention here supervision of financial system that, left alone, would 
cause liquidity problems, regulations of markets, and agricultural subsidies.   
 
2. States adjusted – successfully or not - to the processes according to their own 
interests and strategy 
 
It is under discussion how large is the role of states in globalisation. One extreme is 
that retreat of the state has brought the success, the other one is that success needs an 
active, tough in a different way than previously, state, and the outcomes of  globalisation 
can not be understood without national strategies. Both neoliberal and Marxist thinkers 
take the view that state intervention into the economy, and welfare state intervention, too, 
has ended. In opposition to this conclusion we can see that the bureaucracy of the states 
that have been strengthening in the last some decades not only adopted themselves to 
globalisation, but managed and formed development of their countries through conscious 
and thought over reforms with the aim to strengthen the state itself, and taking into 
consideration of voices of the population. It must be put down because many when speak 
of negative effect of globalisation on state are thinking on the developed world. But the 
emerging countries – manly China and India – realized the chance that globalisation can 
strengthen or weaken the state depending on how the state reacts on it. Globalisation, 
markets forces and the influence of multis made governing of society more difficult, 
eroded some abilities of the state, but deepened other ones; in sum the new state could 
become even stronger than it was previously. 
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In success stories foreign opening was hardly decisive, rather combination of 
institutional innovation and orthodox receipts was important, and exploiting the chances 
provided by the world market through domestic investment and institution building 
strategy. Even after withdrawal of traditional protectionism a patriotic politics, in a broad 
sense, is being implemented. 
Advantages and disadvantage of free trade and protectionism are not given once and 
for all, rather depend on the general directions of global governance. That is there are 
conditions – which can be considered international political – of reaping gains of 
economic opening. National strategy of successful countries reflected the change in these 
conditions. The benefits of foreign trade could have been increased by the fact that 
comparative advantages shifted, as a result of population growth, from raw materials to 
labour intensive products. Earlier in the 19th century free trade improved terms of trade in 
poor countries, but advantages of it were not realized partly because the share of export 
sector was small compared to the respective economy as a whole, partly because of other 
factors.  One can mention among these “other factors” the lack of sovereignty in the era of 
“gun-boat politics” that could have based a policy taking into consideration of local 
interests. And among such factors there are deficiencies of schooling, of property law, of 
quality of government. These, while perhaps did not reverted all positive effects of free 
trade, led to relative lagging, that is to an increase in global inequalities. Later 
protectionism managed to change in these structures. We must give it credit for this 
change even if the form of intervention was far from the optimal. Protectionism, though at 
the short run costly, contributed to preparedness of a country for industrialization. And 
later in our times it was important issue whether economic integration has happened in an 
autonomous way, or was directed by doctriner recommendations of international financial 
institutions believing in the merits of destatisation. 
It is through state management that globalization in 20ths century could contribute to 
economic growth and alleviating poverty. Theses and analysis of economics of external 
relations in regard with the economics of scale, and facts of economic history show that in 
order an economy can realize the advantages of economic integration it must be 
diversified, and sectors with high efficiency gain potential must reach significant share in 
the economy. But this can not be done by the markets only (even if the latter work well), 
rather through by state development policy. 
At the same time new state activism draws the conclusion from the mistakes of the 
old one. It speaks of the importance of market failures but in a new context: main task of 
 11
an active state is to gain information from the private sector about the significant 
externalities, and after that to correct them. It means that a strategic cooperation must be 
built between the state and private sphere, rather than support previously appointed 
winners through subsidies, customs, and similar protective measures. The procedure is 
more important than the outcome. Imperfect information and the problem of acquirement 
of information is just a central issue for protagonists of activist state, as it is for such an 
anti-statist neoconservative, like Hayek, supporting destatisation and cutting back welfare 
state. These problems, however, are radicalized in so far as markets are not exempted 
from them. Market prices should measure profitability of such allocation of resources that 
are still not existent, that would be ensured in theory of general equilibrium by the 
assumption of full markets (therefore there would be price for each thing). This condition, 
however, are not fulfilled in real life, and one can not plan an economic policy on this 
condition, especially in developing countries. 
History of globalization shows that though state policy is influenced by the societal 
context, option of the state is not determined by social classes, organized interest groups, 
international actors and conditions, or the historical past, “iron logic” or modernization. 
Norms of elite is a critical factor, just as the cohesion and world view of it. Possible links 
among members of elite are based on being socialized together, historical consciousness 
of vulnerability of national community, believe or suspicion in regard with state 
development. 
Advantages of foreign capital appear not automatically. States had to intervene in 
line with their strategies, and not according to external dictates, or to profit seeking 
activity of local elites in order that social benefits supersede costs.  
 
3. Welfare commitment and willingness of the state to take part in globalisation ate not 
excluding each other, but globalisation can lead to welfare, not only to growth if a 
strategy for this exists  
 
Globalization does not make impossible emergence of active states, but it is a 
question, how far an active state is a welfare one, as well, or whether there is a collusion 
between state activism oriented on globalization, on the one hand, and the welfare state 
function, on the other. Protagonists of welfare state bring reasons of efficiency on behalf 
of it. But even if one can justify state intervention in general, one can not deduct from this 
the existence, the concrete form, the size and the means of it. Judgment on the costs of 
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market failures is the issue of public political assessment, and the similarly probable 
appearance of state failure can compensate for the devotion correcting market 
imperfections. Eventually mere efficiency reasons do not seem sufficient for the 
justification of welfare state activism. 
The connection between welfare state and growth is an ambiguous issue, the picture 
is not so clear as it was when human capital theory appeared on the scene. 
Notwithstanding in case at least some welfare functions, especially in regard with 
education, state strategy following developmental and growth targets leads to state 
involvement. But espousing welfare state in its full meaning is a different thing, what is 
more, there are opposing views that fear for welfare state, or more exactly, too big state 
hindering growth. 
In this context it should be noted that economic growth is one kind of value while 
evaluating globalization or state activity. But it is not the highest and only one good. It 
seems that peoples’ happiness in developed world is hardly influenced by higher income, 
or only so far as it leads to a decrease in the proportion of the poor. But the case is 
completely different in the developing or emerging regions. 
Welfare state emerged not with the purpose to maximize economic growth but to 
stabilize incomes and through this to subjective well-being. So it is not fair to haul it up 
for, perhaps, not being able to maximize income growth. I investigate what can be said of 
the state in regard with alternative indicators of well-being and measures. There are 
researches that say welfare state does not produce satisfied nation. I consider these studies 
useful so far as they call attention to the complexity of conditions of happiness. But it 
seems to me that because of methodological and data problems their results are not robust.  
According to some researches welfare state function in the context of globalization is 
that state strategy possibly provides a  kind of guaranty, compensation against risks of 
globalization to the citizens by broadening expenditures. Though in this function welfare 
and other expenditures are substituting each other, that is welfare expenditures are not 
exclusively suitable, notwithstanding the logic of compensation is in favor of them. But 
development of welfare institution – as retrenchment of it, too – is not direct consequence 
of  globalization, though under globalization it was not, at least, impossible for the 
emerging countries to make a welfare correction in their policies. 
 
4. Though welfare system of developed countries are under reconstruction, there is not 
a downward convergence among them 
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Problems coming from intensification of North-South trade and capital flows means 
worsening wage and employment position of low skilled workers. It is a serious challenge 
to the state that necessitates reforms, but not a fatal blow on it. 
It is countries on similar level of development that bring mainly competition on each 
other, but in this relation wage difference is much smaller, and social dumping rarely 
takes place. It is in this competition that the question appears whether a state can fulfill its 
tasks in regard with social reproduction efficiently. Here we must mention that different 
welfare model may be not in competitive rather in complementary relation. Flexibility has 
two meaning, static and dynamic, the former characterizes mainly the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the latter rather continental European ones. Static concept demand flexibility 
especially from the employees, the dynamic from the employer, too. Real world, of 
course, is more complex, but comparing Anglo-Saxon and European regimes is not so 
simple as it would be if we understand flexibility as a one dimensional criteria.  
Globalization is not the decisive and most important reason for changes in developed 
countries. Technical progress, de –an post-industrialization or demographic transition can 
cause such social difficulties that can be considered more important than globalization. 
One factor in the reform of welfare state in developed countries is the strengthened 
bargaining position of employers through globalization, but an other, similarly important 
one is that many citizens perceive some anomalies and bad incentives emerging as a by 
effect of the operation of welfare state, and therefore want corrections against one sided 
right based conceptions. Though one can interpret as a reaction to globalization that 
reform targets building work incentives into the provisions, the motivation is not 
necessarily or exclusively this.  
Some changes in welfare politics can be understood as concession to pressures of 
globalization, but other changes are just going against this pressure. Behavior of politics 
depended on the type of existing welfare system, but the regime type did not determine: 
liberal regimes in general were rather willing to accommodate global pressure, but in 
some areas – e.g. in pension system in USA – we can see different reaction. Altogether we 
can not see a pattern that the stronger the global pressure in a region was, the weaker the 
welfare system became. And it is also not the case that the stronger a welfare system was, 
the bigger the impetus by global shift on politics to cut the welfare provisions was. 
Speaking about ‘unsustainability of finance of welfare state’ is a great extent 
unfounded. In so far as fiscal responsibility has been strengthened, there was no need to 
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cut welfare expenditures, it was possible to finance them from tax revenues. Tax policy in 
developed world must adjust to the new system with free capital flows, but up to now it 
was able to do this. At the same time globalization can bring a loss in efficiency as far as 
mobile production factors may be undertaxed, while immobile ones overtaxed. 
 
5. Emerging countries use higher state revenues generated in globalization for a 
broadening range of welfare provisions, but according to different models 
 
It seems that most important countries have recognized that they can avoid 
dependence from external forces only by ensuring a certain, required level of 
macroeconomic stability. Countries in East Asia need less this recognition than those in 
Latin America, where it is a kind of novelty, that political formations emerged that 
represented a lucky mixture of cautious macroeconomic policy targeting internal 
independence and of widening welfare system ensuring internal, popular backing. More 
stability oriented public finance is positive evolvement from the point of view of 
subjective wellbeing. We know from research on happiness that of two persons, having 
the same income, the one who has suffered income loss (that is his present income level is 
lower than the previous one) is less happy. This fact underlies not so much or not 
especially welfare state as a responsible, crisis alleviating, stability oriented state, this way 
that has commitment to welfare, in a broader sense, of its citizens. 
Similarly to welfare systems of developed countries, that of emerging and 
underdeveloped countries do not converge in the era of globalization. Welfare states and 
institutions can be understood not only because of developmental or compensatory 
reasons, but also taking into consideration other characteristics of the respective country: 
its imbeddednes in international regime, internal factors, history of social policy. Reigning 
economic model, democracy, freedom of media, condition of women, culture, 
alienation/distance of elite from lower social layers (that is existence of a kind of national 
unity) all effects on welfare system. Change of welfare institutions is here also path 
dependent in so far as beneficiaries’ (among them those working for the welfare system) 
critique or support influences transformation. That is former welfare rights, more 
significant in Latin America and East Europe than in East Asia, produce supporters for the 
existing regime not only among the claimants, but among the personnel, too. The heritage 
of the past, however, does not prescribe the future path of welfare system, for which Latin 
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America is a good example, where assistance programs are expanded on the part of 
population that earlier was not covered by them. 
It also counts what foreign opening does mean: liberalization of foreign trade, or of 
capital markets, foreign indebtedness, or increase of influence of international institutions. 
Altogether there is no reason why middle income countries would be unable to follow the 
way of developed countries in building up a welfare state. 
As for financing the state developed countries did need cut expenditures, but the 
case is somewhat different in emerging countries. In years of globalization easily 
collectible revenues of state are decreasing, and in order to levy the hardly collectible ones 
states must develop, and strengthen its ability. This can be done only in the spirit of a 
national strategy. Implementation of transformation does not cause stress in budget policy, 
if the change is not shock-like. In order to fulfill this condition liberalization process must 
be managed in accordance with the state strategy. So public finance issues are in favor of 
gradualism of liberalization. 
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